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RESTRUCTURING HUNGARIAN CIVIL-MILITARY
RELATIONS, 1988~1990
Introduction

Hungarian politics had undergone dramatic changes in the 1988-1990 period. During
1988 the gradual shift toward democratization that had characterized Hungary since the mid1980s had rapidly accelerated and left indelible marks on the country's political landscape.

By the end of 1990 Hungarian Communists, who had ruled the country since 1948, became
politically irrelevant.
The transformation of the political system had profound affects on Hungary's arm~d
forces, civil-military relations? and security situation. The Warsaw Pact, of which Hungary
had been a founding II1:ember, had become an essentially defunct military organization by
1990 and was abolished altogether in July 1991. In fact, Hungary'.s new post-Communist
government was the first among the Warsaw Pact_allies to indicate its intent of withdrawal
from the pact. Budapest had succeeded in establishing special diplomatic relations with
NATO irt 1990, and became a member of NATO's Cooperation Council that was created in
-November 1991. Furthermore, the prayers of millions of Hungarians were answered when
the last Soviet troops had finally left Hungary in June 1991, after 46 years of uninterrupted
occupation~ .
The political transformation of Eastern Europe and the collapse of the Soviet Union
were concomitant with the surfacing and re-surfacing of security concerns across the region.
Hungary's national security has been strongly affected by the civil-war in Yugo-slavia on its
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southern border and the subsequent emergence of Slovenia, Croatia, ~d Bosnia-Hercegovina
;

as independent states. At the. same time the troublesome treatment of Hungarian minorities
in Serbia, Slovakia, and particularly in Romania has not been lost on politicians and security
experts.
It could be argued that Hungary, along with Czechoslovakia and Poland, is in a

security limbo of sorts. It is no longer a member of the Warsaw Pact--an alliance system
that, while in many respects disadvantageous for its non-Soviet members, could guarantee the
defense of its territory· from external foes--and is incapable of protecting itself from virtually
any .external threat. Perhaps it is not unreasonable to speculate that Hungary and its East
Central European neighbors to the north might be admitted as full members of NATO within
the next decade, something they all have expressed an interest in.
In the meantime, Hungary's politicians and soldiers have sought to enhance the
country's national security by establishing bilateral military cooperation agreements with
former Warsaw Pact allies neighbors. 1 The three East Central European states (often
referred to as the "Central European Triangle") have actively explored the possibilities of
military cooperation since their first summit meeting in February 1991, in Visegrad,
Hungary. 2 Together with Austria, Italy, and the former Yugoslavia, they have also been
members of the Central European Inltiative (CEI), a regional organization called the
"Hexagonal Group" until its January 1992 summit meeting. Although the CEI is an
organization oriented primarily toward economic and cultural cooperation it encourages the
addressing of common security concerns as well.
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This paper examines the period extending from the May 1988 Conference of the
Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (HSWP) until the end of 1990. The political
transformation from a single-party paternalistic dictatorship to a multi-party democracy was
. concomitant with the metamorphosis of civil-military relations. During this period the
essential role of the Hungarian armed forces underwent a complete change. One of the main
functions of t~e Hungarian People's Army (HPA) under four decades of Communism was the
defense of the party's political monopoly from its internal enemies; the collapse of the
regime made this function irrelevant.
This analysis concentrates on the elements of defense policy and military affairs
where reforms and processes of transformation were most significant. Part I offers a brief
summary of Hungary's political transformation 1n 1988-1990. Part II analyzes the shift in
civil-military relations; Part III focuses on the subsequent democratization and reorganization
of the· armed forces. Part IV, deals with the international relations of the Hungarian armed
forces.

Part I. Political Background: From Communism to Democracy
· A. Domestic Politics
Karoly Grosz's emergence as HSWP leader at the May 1988 HSWP Conference was
welcomed by large segments of the party membership and even the population because it
promised a change from Kadar'_s reluctance to deal with Hungary's mounting political and
economic problems. The new HSWP Politburo remained divided between hard-liners led by
Grosz and reform:-minded politicians such as Imre Pozsgay and Rezso Nyers. In 'November
1988 Grosz relinquished the premiership to Miklos Nemeth, a young and capable HSWP
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politician. It soon became apparent that Nemeth would strengthen the ranks of reformCommunists.
The measure of public support Grosz enjoyed after May 1988 had considerably
eroded by the end of the year following police brutality used against demonstrators in June,
and his ill-fated meeting with Romanian President Ceausescu in August. 3 Moreover, the
fragile balance of power in the Politburo suffered severe blows due to the independent
stances of some of its members. In October 1988 Pozsgay implicitly supported the

"'

· emergence of an alternative movement, the Hungarian Democratic Forum (HDF) by his
'

'

participatio~ in its founding meeting. Antagonism deepened between the popular Pozsgay
and. his foes in the Politburo after the reformer declare4, ·apparently without consulting
Grosz, that the 1956 Revolution, officially still tagged as a "counter-revolution," was a
"popular uprising."
In the meantime, the HSWP's membership declined precipitously. The evolving

crisis of Hungarian socialism was to a large degree due to the HSWP leaders' apparent
perplexity regarding the changing role and function of ideology. The Central Committee, as
Grosz openly admitted, lacked unity of opinion and was beleaguered by "debates about·
questions of tactics, methodology, and working style. "4 By March 1989 there were, in fact,
three separate parties within the HSWP representing "conservative order," "moderate
o:tder," and "socialist reform. "5 The leadership seemed to have realized that some form of
democracy within the party was an essential condition for regaining the membership's
support. The limited party reforms introduced in 1989, however, could not alter the overall
disenchantment of the rank and file membership.

The. government and party leadership also tried to introduce broad political reforms,
but was unable or unwilling to realize that the time when "fine tuning" and "quasi reforms 11
could appease the population had passed; now systemic changes were necessary. 6 The
leadership attempted to initiate or at least study the possibility of reform in several political
areas--particularly electoral, parliamentary, constitutional, and trade union politics.
Nonetheless, most of the grandiose intentions quickly degenerated into piecemeal reforms.
Furthermore, the measures designed to modernize the country's legislative system "were not
· really necessary and some were downright regressive. "7
The leaders' position on the issue of political pluralism had gone through a
remarkably rapid transformation. As late as July 1988, Grosz firmly rejected the idea of a
multi-party system. 8 Even Pozsgay, the most liberal member of the leadership, remarked at
the time that if a multi-party regime were to be established, it would result in a comedy of
"partner parties" for the HSWP, and the situation would be "even more ridiculous than it is
today. "9 Nonetheless, in November 1988 the government permitted the establishment of
political parties and pertinent laws were enacted in a few. months.
Talcing advantage of the fluid political situatio~ and the relative tolerance of party and
government leaders, a large number of democratic political organizations quickly emerged
and began to establish themselves as parties. 10 Some of these, such as the Social
Democratic Party (SDP) and the Independent Smallholders' Party (ISP) already _existed prior
to the elimination of non-Communist political organizations in 1948. Others, such as the
HDF, the Association of Free Democrats (AFD), or the Association of Young Democrats
(AYD) were newly created.

A further milestone in Hungarian politics was the reburial of Imre Nagy. The
. opposition had long demanded an appropriate funeral for Nagy and his associates executed in
1958. In October 1988 Janos Berecz, the HSWP CC's secretary in charge of ideology,
announced that Nagy would soon receive a "proper tomb," signalling the leadership's
weakening resolve. 11 The reburial that took place on the 31st anniversary of the execution
(June 1989) attracted tens of thousands and offered an opportunity to opposition politicians to
gain public recognition.
The June 1989 Polish elections provided additional momentum to the HSWP's
reformist wing. In April, an agreement was reached between the Polish United Workers'
Party and the Solidarity-led opposition which led to the holding of partially free elections.
The accord allowed 35 percent of the seats in the Polish parliament (Sejm) to be open for
free competition and all 100 seats in the Senate. The results astonished not only foreign
observers, but even the most optimist members of the Polish opposition:. they won 260 of the
261 Sejm seats open for competition and all but one of the Senate seats. 12 Mikhail
Gorbachev's explicit rejection of the Brezhnev Doctrine in his July 1989 speech to the
Council of Europe offered an additional boost to Hungary's reform-Communists.
Between June and September 1989 so-called round-table negotiations were held
between the HSWP and the opposition. :The round table, aside from its significance as a new
form of dialogue between the rulers and the opposition, served as a forum for the opposition
parties to familiarize the HSWP, the other parties, and most important of all, the general
public with their views and programs. Agreement about the new electoral law was reac~ed
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in early September. A national referendum held in November decided that Hungary's
president would be elected following the March-April parliamentary elections.
In the meantime, the HSWP had continued to lose support and faced internal crises.
In late June 1989, the top ranks of the party were reorganized. The party leadership elected
Nyers as Chairman and as

a. member of a four-mari Presidium also including Pozsgay,

Grosz, and Nemeth.. The October 1989 HSWP congress resulted in the creation of a new,
reform-minded socialist party (Hu,ngarian Socialist Party [HSP]--Magyar Szocialista Part) led
by the erstwhile reform-Communists of the HSWP: Nemeth, Nyers, Pozsgay, and Foreign
Minister Gyula Horn. The HSWP, reduced to its hard-line elements, continued to operate.
On October 23, 1989, the 33rd anniversary of the aborted 1956 Revolution, Matyas
Szuros, the Chairman of the National Assembly proclaimed the Republic of.Hungary (in
place of the People's Republic). The day before parliament decided to abolish the HSWP's
private army, the 60,000-strong Workers' Guard. The winter of 1989-1990 was an eventful
political period the likes of which the country had not seen for decades. Newly formed
parties were recruiting members and campaigning before the upcoming elections. The HSP,
inheriting its governing position from the HSWP, attempted to distance itself from the
"mistakes of the past" and followed a liberal course. Nonetheless, the election results
demonstrated that Hungarians embraced the opportunity of real choice and turned their backs
· upon the country's rulers. 13
The elections were won handily by'the right-of-center ¥DF (42.5 percent), followed
by the left-of-center AFD (23.8 percent), and the pre-1948 favorite ISP (11.4 percent). The
HSP only secured 8.5 percent of the votes while the HSWP was unable to reach the 4

percent level necessary for parliamentary representation. 14 In early May the new governing
coalition, composed of the Hungarian Democratic Forum, Independent Smallholders' Party,
and the Christian Democratic People's Party (CDPP) began work under the premiership of
Jozsef Antall (HDF). In August the legislature elected Arpad Gonez (AFD) as President of
the Republic of Hungary.
Since the Antall-government took office, it has had to face a multitude of political,
economic, and social problems. The government and legislature have made a concerted
effort to drastically restructure the political and economic system guiding Hungary's return to
political pluralism and market-oriented economy. The government's major problem
continued to be the country's disastrous overall economic situation--high inflation, low
productivity, large foreign debt, to mention just a few problems--for which no easy medicine
could be found. The Antall government faced several widespread strikes of which the most
memorable was the taxi drivers' walkout in October. 1990 that paralyzed ground travel
throughout the country for days. In December, opposition criticism, disagreements within
the governing coalition, and the incompetence of some ministers forced a limited
reorganization of the government. In spite of these problems,· and although Hungary shared
the socio-economic predicament of underdeveloped countries, transformation to a Hungarian
democracy was well on the way by the end of 1990.

B. Foreign Policy

Since the early 1980s foreign policy was one of the few areas that Hungary's
Communist leaders co,uld call a success. During the 1988-1990 period this trend continued,
even under the short tenures of the Grosz and Nemeth governments. Within the Soviet bloc,
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-aungary's affairs were generally well-managed, with a few exceptions .. Ceausescu's plan to
erase thousands of villages--most of which happened to be populated by Hungarians--incited
the anger of Hungarian citizens. The Hungarian leadership made several unsuccessful
attempts to iron out qifferences with Romania. Another contentious issue that also
exacerbated the Grosz government's crisis of legitimacy concerned a joint hydroelectric
project with Czechoslovakia that the Hungarian opposition fiercely opposed due to potentially
harmful economic and environmental effects. Eventually the project was unilaterally broken
off by the Hungarian government.thereby causing tension ~ith the Prag~e leadership.
In spite of the dramatic transformation of Hungarian politics from post-Communism.
to a multiparty democracy, Budapest's relationship with Moscow was relatively undisturbed.
First, by 1988 Gorbachev apparently had decided not to interfere with the developments of
Eastern Europe. He renounced the Brezhnev Doctrine during his March 1988 visit to
Yugoslavia and again, even more explicitly, in July in his address to the Council of Europe.
The Soviet leadership recognized diversity in the bloc and appeared committed to
consultation rather than issuing directives to the region. Moscow's first priority· was taking
care of its own economic and political problems. Even political--let alone military-intervention would have undercut Gorbachev's efforts to divert resources away from the
mili_tary to domestic n~eds and to gain Western assistance in doing so. The Soviet Union
played the role of an interested but not terribly concerned bystander throughout the East
European transformation. Political developments in Hungary, for instance, were generally
reported objectively and without scathing criticism in the USSR. 15 Second, Hungarian
politicians were continuously reassuring Moscow about their sensitivity to Soviet interests

and their actions reflected awareness of the geopolitical realities. Nonetheless, Moscow and
Budapest disagreed on several issues. One of these had centered around the utility of the
Council of Mutual. Economic Assistance until it was- disbanded in January 1991. 16
Hungary did face short-term conflicts with Czech~slovakia and East Germany
following the Nemeth government's decision to dismantle the "iron curtain" on Hungary's
border with Austria. Berlin and Prague condemned the .Hungarian decision. Later the GDR
and Czechoslovakia fiercely protested Budapest's refusal to return East German refugees to
their homeland, but the rapid collapse of these regimes prevented the development of serious
crises. In fact, the decision yield~d Hungary considerable political capital in the West, and
particularly in West Germany. Although the Nemeth and Antall governme)J.ts continued to
make gestures toward post-Ceausescu Romania, tensions between the two countries did not
ease perceptibly. Hungary offered medical and humanitarian aid to Romania following the
_December 1989 Revolution, indeed, Foreign Minister Gyula Horn was the first foreign
statesman to offer aid and visit the country.
Hungary achieved its greatest foreign policy successes with the industrialized West. 17
In 1988-1990 Hungarian leaders met vfrtually all of their Western counterparts a number of
times. For example., Hungarian leaders met their American colleagues on several occasions.
Grosz visited the U.S. in 1988 and met President Reagan; in the following year Nemeth
hosted President Bush in Budapest, while in the fall of 1990 both President Gonez and Prime
Minister Antall were welcomed in the White House. The Antall government intends to build
on the successful foreign policy of the reform-Communist Foreign Minister Gyula Horn,

whose name has become synonymous with the aggressive Hungarian opening towards the
West.
In its economic predicament Hungary is tn dire need of Western good will and
economic aid, One of the main themes of the present government is the "return to Europe,"
that is

to say, Western Europe. Some successes were already achieved in 1988-1990. In

November 1990 Hungary became the first East European state to be admitted into the
Council of Europe. A year later the European Community extended associate membership to
.

,

Hungary, as well as to Czecho-Slovakia and Poland. Although full membership in the
European Community remains a faraway prospect, Budapest seems determined to achieve
that objective in the 1990s. In spite of its crisis-ridden economy, the country has been able
to secure loans and sympathetic treatment from Western creditors.

·Part II. The Transformation of Civil-Military ~elations
The political transformation of 1988-1990 resulted in e~ually significant changes in
civil-military relations. By the end of 1990 the political structure of the Hungarian armed
forces was completely reorganized and the military brought under the de jure control of the
democratically elected parliament and its President. In June 1989 the National Assembly
approved the text of the new military oath that obliged soldiers (along with civil servants and
policemen) to serve the Republic of Hungary and its Constitution. The new pledge expresses
the independence of the HPA from party politics and ideology, the end of party con~ol, and
the allegiance of its signers to Hungary's post-Communist constitutional order and national
sovereignty. 18

In November the new oath was

professiona! corps. 19

signed by over 99 percent of the HPA's

Not surprisingly, ·none of the existing models of Communist party,..army dynamics
considered the possibility of such a drastic transformation of civil-military relations. Models
pertaining to the Soviet Union have examined the subject matter as

an essentially static

phenomenon and ignored the possibility of change in the relationship. 20 Theoretical
constructs concerning Eastern Europe do contemplate the dynamics of evolution but none
discus~ the possibility of transformation of civil-military relations from a Communist to·a
democratic· political system. 21

A. Depoliticization: The End of Party Control
The changes in the political life of the armed forces were very rapid. One of the
main avenues of the Communist party's control over the military was the extensive system of
party organizations in the armed forces; their gradual elimination and the subsequent
prohibition of any party activity in the army was the most important aspect of
depoliticization.
If one is to believe General Szombathelyi, Grosz's military adviser, the party had
relinquished its control over the HPA and "did not demand any privileges in the armed
forces" following the May 1988 HSWP Conference. 22 In late 1988, the HSWP CC's
Administrative Department, the CC organization responsible for the armed forces, was
abolished within the framework of an organizational reshuffling. This did not yet mean,
however, that the HPA ceased to be the HSWP's army. For all practical purposes, the
army's Supreme Commander remained HSWP chief Grosz and the political allegiances of the
. HPA continued to be unambiguous. Neither the HPA's internal regulations nor the
Constitution prescribed who possessed the ultimate authority over the military. Hungary's
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Prime Minister, Miklos Nemeth, inadvertently provided a good illustration of this problem.
When asked in July 1989 who was the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, the Prime
Minister answered that "it is not possible at present to give an unequivocal reply to this. "23
The National Assembly simply did not have the authority to deny the HSWP an outright
takeover of the armed forces since the HP A was under party, not state or government
control. 24 The law permitting HPA personnel to join political parties other than the HSWP
was approved by parliament, against the opposition of the army leadership, only in late June
1989. In reality, the HSWP maintained direct control over the HPA until late summer
1989. 25
Throughout the first half of 1989 the military press published a large number of
articles examining politico-ideological decay within the armed forces. Most of these studies,
however, did not see--or did not want to overtly acknowledge--the hopeless disintegration of
the JISWP and its youth organization (CYL) within the-HPA. Instead, they sought to
remedy the ills of the army's HSWP organizations by prescribing "enhanced party discipline"
.and, especially, "renewal. "26 The criticisms targeted the "work style" and "authoritative
atmosphere" of seemingly endless party meetings as well as the disenchantment of the party
members who frequently_ failed to attend. 27 This is, of course, not to say that the majority
of the army's professional cadres shared these views; rather it signifies that as late as the
spring of 1989 only these opinions could be published in the military press. It is clear,
however, that as a general rule, the older generation in the HPA was reluctant to embrace
the political transformation ' taking place in Hungary.

14·:The generals, connected by myriad ties to the HSWP, would have preferred even the
admission of new parties in the military to the abolition of the HPA's HSWP ·organizations,
according to Defense Minister Karpati. 28 The army leadership repeatedly stressed the
'professional corps' "committment to socialism" and that the HSWP's "influence" in the
armed forces was fustified as long as its program was acceptable for the population.29 They
conveniently ignored the fact that Hungarians were never asked whether or not they
"accepted" the Communist party's program. In May, General Szombathelyi still insisted that
there was nothing ·objectionable in a politicized army as most militaries did play a political
role. He added. that direct HSWP control over ~he HPA ceased in early 1989 although the
party did not wish to give up its influence (i.e., organizations) in the armed forces. 30 In
September, the Code of Service was modified in to allow HPA personnel to join other
_political parties and to participate in religious services in uniform. 31
A few months and a hot political summer later, speakers at the HPA's Party
Conference conceded that the "membership had been turning away from the HSWP and was
declining"; and that although approximately 82 percent of professional soldiers retained their
party cards the "signs of social crisis did not leave the HPA unaffected. "32 Even though at
the September 1989 meeting of the HPA's HSWP Committee the existence of "reform
committees" within the organization was denied, the same committee held an important·
meeting in mid-September at which several reform proposals concerning the military's
depoliticization were heard. The participants agreed that the army could not be used to
promote political interests and voiced their intention to bar all parties (including the HSWP)
from the armed forces. 33
/

/
,
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At this point, however, there was no consensus within the military--or more precisely,
between most of the army leaders and the officer corps--regarding the future political
position of the HPA. At the September HPA Party conference General Bela Gyorgyi, First
Secretary of the HSWP in the armed forces, acknowledged that the demand for the military's
'

.

depoliticization aroused "uncertainty" in the army. Nonetheless, the delegates agreed that
HSWP organizations should_ leave the armed forces (the Ministry of Defense [MOD] by the
end of 1989, other HPA bodies by late 1990).34 Some participants called for an
acceleration of this s~hedule; they got their wish since by early 1990 there were no active
party organizations in the military.
It is important to note that while senior army leaders were reluctant to embrace the
political transformation, throughout the process they continued to reassure the population that
the HPA would remain calm and had no intention in getting involved in politics. 35
Although few Hungarians believed in such an ·eventuality, taking such

an unambiguous stance

certainly earned points for the armed forces. The fact that some generals were less than
happy s~ing the unfolding political events ·is entirely understandable in view of the privileges
and high party co~tacts they stood to lose.
By February 1990, the Nemeth government's Deputy Defense Minister Szombathelyi
· announced that the depoliticization of the army w~s completed.36 For four decades, the
Communist propaganda machine had made

an immense. effort to socialize the armed forces

but in the end it turned out to be ineffectual. What were the _reasons for this failure? First
of all, as the models of Herspring and Volgyes on the one hand, and of Alexiev on the other
pointed out, the "socialist value system" with its heavy emphasis on "international" values
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had never replaced national allegiances in the armed forces. Second, many members of the
professional officer corps, let alone the draftees, resented the Soviet domination over
Hungary in general, and over the HPA in particular. Third, professional personnel_ had been
annoyed by the large amount of time spent with political-ideological training at the expense
of the improvement of professional skills. Fourth, the deterioration of the living standards of
professional cadres adversely affected their morale. Fifth, as a result of these factors, the
social prestige of .the military. profession had decreased drastically, therefore, fewer qualified
candidates were interested in this career, consequently the HPA had faced profound
recruitment problems.
The majority of professional cadres, then, welcomed "the end of ideology" and the
opportunity to concentrate on more specifically military missions. 37 In September 1989 the
participants of the HSWP and opposition round-table negotiations agreed to set up a Defense
Council following the general elections. The President of the Republic, the Chairman of
Parliament, the Prime Minister, the members of the government, one representative of each
party in parliament, and the Chief-of-Staff of the armed forces would constitute this Council
which would exercise the powers of the President and the governmentin cases of
emergency. 38
In early 1990 the Defense Law was modified, -according to the recommendations of .
the round-table, so as to revoke the.licence of the armed forces to interfere in domestic
political processes. 39 This drastically changed the character of the Hungarian army, for it
freed· the military from one of its most important functions under Communism: the defense
of the regime from its internal foes. In March 1990 parliament agreed to change the name of
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the armed forces from Hungarian People's Army (Magyar Nephadsereg) to Hungarian Army
(Magyar Honvedseg--HA).
The new Hungarian parliament included only two deputies with extensive military
affiliations, both long retired and imprisoned by the Communists. Kalman Keri (born in
· 1901) had been a high-ranking officer in Horthy's army and subsequently the "tenant of
several Soviet and Hungarian penal camps and prisons. "40 The othe:r was General Bela
Kiraly (born in 1912) who returned after a 33-year stay in the United States. Both former
officers--along with other martyrs of the Hungarian armed forces persecuted by the
Communist regiine--were rehabilitated.

B. Political Officers, Military Training, and Prestige
In December 1989 P!ime Minister Nemeth announced that since HPA "no longer.
needed,; the Main Political Administration (MPA), one of its most important components the
MPA was abolished. 41 The MOD had already reclassified political officers as "educational,
social, and political" officers in September 1989. Their new job description was to offer
patriotic training, as well as cultural and political enlightenment to conscripts although one
might suspect that such an abrupt decision resulted in little more than a change of labels. 42
The Antall-government's Defense Minister, Lajos Fur, then decided that these functions
ought to be carried out by unit commanders and their subordinates as in most democratic
armies (or, as it were, in the pre-war Hungarian army). Secretary of State for Defense Erno
Raffay justified this measure; saying that the new g~vernment wanted a depoliticized army
and did n0t need officers who tried to imbue recruits with the "socialist-internationalist"
value system. 43 Shortly thereafter, in August 1990, the MOD announced that some 900
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erstwhile political officers would be transferred. to other areas-in the Hungarian Army or
discharged. 44
The power struggle arid jockeying for positions accompanying Hungary's political
transformation affected the other military positions as well. By February 1990_ more than 50
generals and 400 colonels were ·retired; the" average age of professional soldiers dropped to
35 years. 45

Many officers (1,700 in the first half of 1990 alone) left the service as a result

of having better career opportunities in civilian life. The question of what to.do with those
officers who had been active in the HSWP was also addressed by the new political
leadership.
At a session of the parliament's Defense Committee, representatives debated the II red
or expert" issue and came to the conclusion that since "it was impossible to dismiss the entire
army" professional competence should be the dec;isive factor. 46 ·Defens~ Minister Fur said
that while most officers had been HSWP members, it was impossible to say how many of
them had been committed Communists. The new MOD, he added, was hopeful that the
I

mentality of Communist officers could be altered, but those who could not change their ways
would have to leave the armed forces. 47
\

The need for the rapid replacement of officers active in the HSWP necessitated the
revamping of military education and training within the framework of the army's
transformation. Since the army's internal repressive function became irrelevant, officer
training was altered to reflect this change. 48 In the Communist era as much as 30 percent
of the instruction was taken up by Marxism-Leninism and other politico-ideological subjects
although the dogmatism that had characterized these courses diminished after 1987.49

.1g~

Starting with the 1989-1990 academic year, ideological ~training at the colleges was replaced
by courses on military and security policy, international military law, and military history.
At the Zrinyi Military Academy new subjects were introduced to ensure that education was
based on national interest. 50 Instead of socialist-internationalist values, officer training
emphasized Hungarian political and military history, democratic values, and patriotism.
The structure of education at military colleges was also reorganized. The 1987
reform that reduced the training period to three years was unsuccessful as the pool of
candidates did not improve--one high-ranking officer remarked that "we could only attract
mediocre students, and I am being tactful"--and th~ quality of training suffered. 51
Therefore, military leaders ·successfully called for the reintroduction of a four-year program
and raising admission standards. Field training mirrored the change in Hungary's military
doctrine: only methods and elements of defensive warfare were practiced. In order to
'
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guarantee the continued preparedness of the officer corps, the MOD planned to test the
knowledge and aptitude of officers in five-year intervals. Promotion would be conditional on
performance in these examinations; those who failed risked being discharged. 52
In the 1949-1989 period approximately 2,600 Hungarian officers received their
military college degrees in the USSR, 120 in Poland, and 65 in Czechoslovakia. In addition,
around 4,000~HPA officers participated in post-graduate and other courses (2-10 months in
duration) in the USSR. 53 While the training of Hungarian cadets in the Soviet Union was
under .review by the new government, the Soviet government
also signalled that it was no
I
',

loriger willing to subsidize the education of foreign officers. A presidential decree permitted
Soviet military colleges to charge for the training of foreign nationals, that reportedly costs

US$· l ,5_00 a month per student. 54 Only 20 percent of Hungarian officer candidates who
. studied in the USSR in 1989-1990--those close to completing their programs--enrolled in the
1990-1991 academic year; the rest were recalled and transferred to other institutions.
According to Defense Minister Fur, Hungary would like to limit the training of its officer
candidates in the USSR to a "few specialized areas." Instead, the MOD plans to send cadets
to Great Britain, Germany, France, Italy, and the United States. Because of its lack of
funds, the hope was that at least initially Hungarian cadets could be supported by the host
institutions through special scholarships. 55
The MOD would like the new army to attract the best and the brightest of young
Hungarian men, but it is unclear what these hopes are based on. In the recent past, only 60
percent of enrolled students graduated, largely because of inferior academic performance and
disenchantment with the armed forces. 56 The prestige of the military career is at an all-time
low and unlikely to increase, primarily because. of the low income of professional soldiers.
In•' the first half of 1990, 1,700 officers requested their discharge, in spite of the MOD's

efforts to improve the conditions of career soldiers. 57 What must be even more troubling to
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military leaders is that usually officers with the highest qualifications leave the service as
they are the most attractive for prospective civilian employers. Professional military
personnel had not been permitted to take ori a second job but their wage increases had not
kept up with the high inflation rate of recent years. As a result, approximately 10 percent of
'

active office~s live under the official poverty line, in the·case of NCOs this figure is even
higher. 58 The MOD wants to raise the salary of its professional corps but the government's
willingness and ability to remedy the situation at a time of profound economic difficulties is

doubtful. . The prestige and the relative material rewards of the profession is the lowest in
Eastern Europe. At the same time the demands on line officers are immense, their life
expectancy (58.9 years) is six years lower than that of other Hungarian males. 59 Every
fourth officer retires for medical reasons. 60
In adcjition, the army's arsenal is clearly substandard and because of its decreasing
budget it even has trouble maintaining its equipment, a factor that is sure to repel technically
inclined youths. For all these reasons, it is difficult to believe that the profession's ·
reputation will be considerably improved in the foreseeable future. Thus, Hungarian service
academies expect to face recruitment problems in the future, therefore the system of the w~ll
functioning military high schools--an expensive solution that has had a limited impact--will be
probably maintained for lack of other solutions in the foreseeable future. In the future, in
contrast.with earlier practice, graduates of these schools will have to pass the entrance
examination ad_ministered by military colleges. 61
Another factor contributing to the low prestige of the profession is that the armed
forces--more precisely, the military leadership--has for long been perceived by the population
as the refuge of the extremely incompetent and corrupt. A few recently published books
only confirmed this belief. 62 Moreover, for decades Hungarians had viewed the military
not as the guarantor of the nation's security but as a representative of foreign interests. It is
possible that the "nationalization" of the military may change the minds of some youths about
a military career. Despite the severe budgetary problems, the MOD plans to demonstrate the
importance of the army's national character by introducing new uniforms "expressing the
\

spirit of the Hungarian Army" as early as 1992. 63 In addition, other external attributes such

22~

as manners of address ("comrade" was replaced by "brother-in-arms" [bajtars] under Karpati
only to be changed to "sir" [ur] by Fur), ceremonial processions were altered to conform to
pre-1945 practices. 64
In short, by the end of 1990 the Hungarian army once again emerged as a national
institution. Again, none of the theoretical approaches considered could anticipate these
developments, consequently, none is relevant to Hungarian civil-military relations in the
1990s for this is no longer a "Communist party-state" but a constitutionally established
democratic polity.

Part ID. Democratization and· Reorganization of the Armed Forces

The internal democratization and reorganization of the Hungarian armed forces are
very important elements of the transformation of civil-military relations for they demonstrate
the extent of military depoliticization. The result of this ph_enomenon was that by the end of
1990 the principles commanding the internal workings of the HPA had become in many ways
similar to those of its democratic counterparts elsewhere.

A.· Internal Democratization

Although military leaders attempted to improve the lot of professional cadres in the
1988-1990 period, in important respects their conditions had not changed. For instance,
young officers and NCOs were often at the mercy of their superiors and the Code of Service
obliged them to seek remedy of their problems from the same ·individuals who caused them.
Although a National Federation of Soldier's Associations was created in the first half of
1990, many line officers felt that this body could not solve their problems since it was

controlled by their commanders. -As a safeguard, professional soldiers established the
AssoGiation to Protect Soldiers' Interests in September. 65 The MOD did not debate the
validity of the soldiers' complaints but rather insisted that relations between the ranks had to
be governed by the Service Code. Defense Minister Fur suggested that both sides wait until
the Constitutional Court rules on the matter.
In contrast, the service conditions of conscripts had further improved in the 1988-1990 period. In early 1989 the HPA introduced monthly "reception days" when conscripts
could forego the usual channels (i.e., requesting remedy for their complaints from their
direct superiors) and discuss their grievances directly '3/ith their unit commanders.
According to then Defense Minister Karpati, it was hoped that this measure would disperse
the soldiers' feeling of defenselessness. 66 With the abolition of political-ideological
education, conscripts were allowed to spend their free time as they saw fit. These were
important measures not only because they made conscript life easier, but also because they
signalled changes in the military establishment's attitude toward the civilian population.
Relations between the army and the CJmrches had· shown a marked improvement in
the 1988-1990 period. This process started in the mid-1980s with a few minor gestures ·
extended to theological students serving in the HPA. Starting in 1990 they were required
only to complete a one-month basic training preceding their studies. For the balance of their
service time they would work as military chaplains following their ordination. 67 In
September 1990 a delegation of Italian military chaplains visited the MOD to share their
experiences. The post-Communist army's lead~rs had already familiarized themselves with
the system of military chaplaincy in the Austrian and West German armed forces; an MOD

spokesman said that the Ministry wanted. to study the Italian and Swiss systems before
committing itself to a proposal. 68
The question of alternative (i.e.~, unarmed) military service was seriously drscussed in
the MOD for the first time in June 1988. 69 The Defense Law was modified to allow
conscientious objectors to serve in the HPA without weapons starting in 1989. In.March
1989 the Minister of Justice suspended the prison sentences of the 70 young men who
refused military service on grounds of religious beliefs and conscientious objection. In June,
those opposed to armed service were offered two options: alternative service in the armed
forces or work in the health and social welfare fields. 70
The length of man_datory military service of conscripted ·soldiers was eased on several
occasions starting with the early 1980s. The terms of service of the Hungarian armed forces
changed in conjunction with the democratization processes and the shrinking military's size ...
reduced from 18 to 12 months' in 1990,
a measure already
The length of service was
~
.
proposed by the Nemeth government in 1989. As a result of this measure 15,000 soldiers·
expecting to serve 18 months at the time of their entrance to the armed forces were
discharged after only a year's service in August 1990. The total service time thus became 22
months (12 months full time and 10 months in the reserves). 71 The terms of alternative and
civilian service were reduced from 28 to 22 months as well.

B. Structural Reorganization

Already by 1987 the Hungarian forces were restructured along the lines of the brigade
system. The most important decisions concerning the reorganization of the HPA's
administrative setup were taken in late 1989. In December 1989, two days after a regular

meeting of Warsaw Pact defense ministers in Budapest, Prime Minister Nemeth announced
several changes in Hungarian defense policy. The government justified the measures by its
new defensive security doctrine that required the reorganization of the military
establishment. 72 This task entailed "drastic and expedient" reductions in manpower and
equipment within the Warsaw Pact in general and in the Hungarian Army in particular.
Clearly, some of these decisions were occasioned by Hungary's extremely difficult economic
situation. Furthermore, the new measures were expected to meet with popular endorsem~nt
as well· as the approval of the international community.
One of the most important facets of the reform package was the radical reorganization
of the military command structure. In fact, nearly all employees of the Ministry proper had
assumed new positions during the reorganization. The most significant change in the
structure of the military command was that the MOD was divided into two separate entities:
'
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a Defense Ministry (MOD) with a relatively small staff of 135 in place of the earlier 1,500,
and a so called "Command of the Hungarian Army" (CHA). In the new system the MOD is
responsible for military policy and planning, doctrinal matters, the military'. s foreign
contacts, and other administrative and theoretical matters. The CHA, the practical arm of
the defense establishment, is charged with the tasks of supervising actual military training
and development, e~ercises, and the like. The MOD is accountable to the Prime Minister
and the government, while the Commander of the Hungarian Army--in accordance with the
new Constitution--is responsible to the President of the Republic, who is the Commander-inChief of the Armed Forces. 73

.Changes in military personnel were also implemented to accommodate the new
organizational scheme and to retire and promote cadres in late 1989. Defense Minister
Karpati retained his post until the national elections of March-April 1990. General Kalman
Lorincz was appointed Commander of the HPA, a position that gave him the rank of State
Secretary. General Laszlo Borsits was appointed as Lorincz's first deputy and Chief of
Staff. 74 Sevt;ral former deputy ministers were retired, among them General Lajos Krasznai,
the erstwhile head of the HPA's MPA, who was transferred to the diplomatic corps. 75
Shortly after the new appointments were publicized, observers pointed out that some
of the military's new leaders had openly discussed their orthodox political views in the past
and thus did pot seem to fit the concept of radical military reform. The Nemeth
government's answer to these charges was that personnel changes could be best characterized
as "generatidnal,11 adding that many more cadres were soon to be retired. 76 The
government also suggested that although all defense ministers in the WTO were military
officers, bec*use of the Hungarian reorganization it was now possible to appoint a civilian.
In fact, quickly after the announcement of the reforms Karpati "became" a civilian, having
donned a suit in lieu of his uniform, and entered the reserves. In mid-May 1990, Jozsef
Antall nam~ Lajos Fur as his Minister of Defense. Fur, a prominent HDF politician and
'

former university history professor, had no experience in military affairs at the time of this
appointment.. Admittedly, not all military personnel were in favor of the reforms announced
in Decemberl 1989. Accordfog to the MOD, some commanders unable to identify with the
changes were dismissed or transferred. At the same time, as MOD ·spokesman Colonel

Keleti conceded, some WTO leaders were perturbed by the swiftness and scope of the
Hungarian military reforms. 77
The main purpose of the command structure's reform was to render the armed forces
accountable to the Hungarian government and the President of the Republic. This aspect of
the reorganization--and it should be emphasized that it was introduced by the (reform)Communist government--demonstrated a momentuous change in civil-military relations.
Whereas the military was previously subordinated to the party, the December 1989 measures
ensured that the armed forces would be controlled not by any party organization but by the
goverpment and, ultimately, the President. The implementation of this reform broke with the
40-year practice of the Communist Party's direct control of the armed forces.

C. ·Cuts in Manpower, Equipment, and Defense Allocations

The more favorable international environment--particularly the improvement of
superpower relations and the absence 'of Moscow's disapproval--enabled Nemeth's
government to implement considerable reductions in Hungary's armed forces.7 8 In January
1989 the government announced that Hungary would cut its troop strength and equipment by
9 percent (9,300 men) in 1989-1990.79 In late November the Council of Ministers decided
on another 20-25 percent of manpower by the end of 1991. 80 The result of these cuts will
be a much smaller, lightly_atmed military. The army's arsenal may improve in relative
terms as the most obsolete weaponry will be discarded. In January 1990, the armed forces
was composed of 106,800 men and 15,000 civilian employees: By the end of 1991, the
number was to be reduced to 75,000 men, one-third of them career soldiers, plus 15,000

civilians, for a grand total of 90,000--a reduction of over 30,000. According to Fur, the
military's manpower·would stabilize at 0.6-0.8 percent of the population. 81
By all accounts, the arsenal of the HPA has been decidedly mediocre but observers
presumed that it was sufficient for Hungary's defense needs. The shocking inadequacy of the
armed forces' equipment' was revealed by some of the generals summoned before the ad hoc
parliamentary committee examining the allegations in Colonel Bokor' s book, Petty Tyrants in
Uniform. This thin volume gave a grim portrayal of corruption -and incompetence in the
HP A that astounded the population. The parliamentary inquiry came to the conclusion that
Hungary's defense capabilities were hopelessly insufficient.
General Mihaly Torok, for instance, ,explained that Hungary possessed neither good
quality anti-tank guns to hold off an offensive nor equipment that could secure her
borders. 82 In addition, the arm}' had not a single bomber, no sufficient air defense
_capabilities to protect either the population or the ground forces, and whatever equipment it
owned was on average 30 years old. The vast majority of armored carriers were often
unable to leave their bases because of poor repair and obsolescence. Torok added that the
reason for this situation was the distribution of tasks in the WTO and that the Pact's
antiquated offensive doctrine had rendered Hungary effectively impotent to defend itself.
The defense of the country's· air space, for example, was of "tolerable" quality only when the
army's capabilities were complemented by those of the Southern Group of Soviet Forces
(SGSF) stationed in Hungary. 83
,

Hungary had never received the most modern equipment from the Soviet Union.
According to General Janza, the Head of the MOD's Department of Economics, the weapons
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the HPA could buy from the USSR always lagged behind the Soviet military technology by
10-12 years. 84 Even though the Soviets sold relatively sophisticated equipment, such as
MiG-29 airplanes, to countries like Egypt and India, Hungary never ·received any such
equipment. The lack of Moscow's willingness to entrust advanced weapons to its Hungarian
ally caused a great deal of resentment among HPA officers. 85 Due to the drastically
reduced defense budgets, it is unlikely that the MOD will be able to substantially improve the
army's arsenal in the foreseeable future. These problems were exacerbated by the fact that
beginning i_n 1991, Hungary had to pay in hard currency for the weapons and spare parts
procured from the USSR--and after the disintegration of the Soviet Union from Russia-because of a bilateral agreement to conduct all trade in convertible currency. Hungary has,
nonetheless, expressed interest in acquiring new weapons, for instance T-72 tanks, from the
arsenal of the former East German armed forces. 86 (Reportedly, Czechoslovakia and
Poland are also eyeing the same tanks.) Hungary would like to obtain more modern surplus
equipment from the United States as well. 87
Nevertheless, diminishing government allocations make even these modest plans
unlikely to succeed; indeed, it is doubtful whether the Hungarian Army will be able to
maintain its arsenal at the current level. On average, military spending accounted for 4.1
percent of the GDP in the 1986-1989 period. 88 The government's defense budget for 1989,
adjusted for inflation, dropped by 17 percent. 89 The 1990 budget of the army was slashed
by 30 percent in real terms, compared to 1989. Only 35.8 billion forint (US$ 560 million)
wa~ set aside from the budget for defense purposes. 9-0 Initially, Fur contended that the
armed forces would need a minimum of 75 billion forint (approximately US$ 880 million) in
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1991 to maintain operations and to acquire some much-needed equipment. While annual per
capita military expenditures were $80 in Hungary, they were three times higher in
Czechoslovakia and one-and-a-half times higher in Romania. 91 Notwithstanding Fur's
claims, defense only received 54.46 billion forint from Hungary's 1991 budget (of which the
MOD had to generate 7.05 billion), some 30 percent less in real terms than in the previous

year.92
Hungary's small defense industry has been very adversely affected by the economic
crisis in· general, and the drastic reductions in military spending in particular. Because. of the
elimination of state subsidies and the dramatic diminution of domestic and foreign orders, the
divisions of most enterprises producing military equipment have been unprofitable sine~ the ·
mid-1980s. 93 The cuts in the army's manpower and equipment dealt an additional blow to
the defense industry resulting in layoffs and enormous losses in revenue. The industry is in
a profound crisis and its recovery_ is difficult to foresee. 94

Part IV. Hungary, the Warsaw Pact, and Soviet Troop Withdrawals

The collapse of East European Communism was concomitant with the disintegration
of the regional economic and military organizations. The CMEA was unceremoniously
abolished in January 1991, the Warsaw Pact met the same fate on July 1. By the end of
1990, the WTO was reduced to a proforma military organization as a result of the East
European revolutions and the reunification of the two Germanies.

A. Hungary and the Pact
Until 1988 the questioning of Hungary's membership in the Warsaw Pact was one of
the few remaining taboos in the country. ·Asa res_ult of the democratization process, which
ent?iled the rapid liberalization of the media, the issue of Hungary's Warsaw Pact
membership soon became one of the most frequently debated topics in the Hungarian media.
The publication of the views of Soviet Academician Oleg Bogomolov that a neutral Hungary
would not pose a threat to the security of the Soviet Union gave further impetus to this ·
discussion. 95 In his Council of Europe address in the summer of 1989, Gorbachev
renounced the . Brezhnev doctrine and said that "any attempts to restrict the sovereignty of
.

states--friends, allies, or any others--are inadmissible. "96 Hungarian politicians also
received signals from senior Soviet officials-,-Politburo member Yegeny Primakov, CPSU
Spokesman Nikolai Shishlin and others--that the USSR would tolerate WTO dropouts and
"Hungary could leave the alliance if it chose to. "97
The process that culminated in Budapest's announcement of its intention to withdraw
from the WTO in June 1990 approximately corresponded to the democratization of
Hungarian politics. In April 1989 Foreign Minister Horn had said that political changes in
Hungary were valuable within the WTO framework and withdrawal from the Pact was but an
illusion. 98 By mid-year, however, the official media began to publish articles and
interviews questioning Hungary's WTO membership. In June, for instance, Professor Istvan
_Dioszegi, a respected diplomatic historian, was quoted as saying that "from a Hungarian
perspective the alliance is devoid of any reciprocity and is nothing else but the unilateral
limitation of Hungarian sovereignty. "99 Still, the government while allowing itself to

criticize certain aspects of the Pact--Foreign Minister Horn, for instance, said that the WTO
should concentrate on military cooperation rather than on ideological or bilateral questions-was not officially con_sidering abandoning the alliance.
One of the first issues the new legislature discussed in May 1990 was the withdrawal
from the WTO. The AFD suggested that the government decide the issue as quickly as
possible. 100 International reaction to the AFD's motion was decidedly cooL101 Not
unexpectedly, WTO l~ders rejected Western (and Hungarian) views that the Pact was in
decline and in a deep crisis. General Piotr Lusn.ev, Commander-in.:.Chief of the WTO's
United. Armed-Forces stated in May that '·'in today's Eastern Europe there is no--and there
can be no--other alternative mechanism that could influence Europe's stability more
•efficiently than the WTO. "102 In the spring of 1990, the Budapest government began to
seriously study the possibility of a unilateral withdrawal from the Pact. According to the
Hungarian position, the Warsaw Pact contradicted the country's national interests, had
become "obsolete and superfluous," and "its existence was not justified by the given
circumstances of European development. 11103 At the June 1990 Moscow meeting of the
WTO' s Political Consultative Committee, Prime Minister Antal! proposed the eliminaton of
the Pact's military component by the end of 1991. More importantly, he announced
'
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Hungary's intention to leave the WTO's military arm in 1991 but made it clear that the
ultimate objective of his government was full withdrawal from the Pact. 104 Following his
talks .with Soviet Defense Minister Dimitrii Yazov, Fur announced that he had informed his
Soviet counterpart that Hungary would no longer take part· in joint WTO exercises, would

)

remove its armed forces from the Warsaw Pact Joint Command, and place them entirely
under national authority. 105
IIungary's Parliament voted overwhelmingly (232 for, none against, and 4
abstentions) for a full withdrawal from the Pact on June 26, 1990. 106 Soviet media reaction
to the vote was negative but commentators did concede that "the Hungarian people were
brought to their knees under the flag of the WTO. 11107 In October, shortly before his visit
to the United States, Antall urged Washington to fill the void in Eastern Europe left by
Soviet retrenchment, expressing his preference for sustained American military presence in
Europe despite the end of the Cold War. At the same time he confirmed that "even if the
military part of the Pact is not dissolved in -1991, we will withdraw from it. 11108 As it
turned· out, this was not necessary as the WTO quietly expired on July 1, 1991.

B. The End of Soviet Occupation
As political repression of the opposition weakened in the late 1980s, the sensitive
issue of Soviet troops in Hungary began to surface ever more frequently. 109 After 1988,
the once sacred subject had become a hotly debated issue and questions concerning the
political, military, and strategic rationale for the approximately 65,000 Soviet soldiers
stationed "temporarily"· in the country sinc,e 1945 had been openly discussed in the media.
In 1989 the USSR pulled out some 12,000 troops within the framework of Gorbachev's
unilateral cuts of Soviet troops in Eastern Europe. TIJ_e fate of the remaining Soviet soldiers
and their equipment was the main topic of three rounds of talks between Soviet and
Hungarian foreign and defense ministry officials in February and March 1990. 110 The
agreement was signed on March 9 by the two foreign ministers, Eduard Shevardnadze and
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Gyula Horn in Moscow. 111 Thereby the Soviet Union agreed to withdraw all of its soldiers
and equipment by the end of June 1991.
The lack of clear regulations was at least partly to blame for the serious difficulties
concerning the departure of Soviet troops from the Hungary. The first Hungarian-Soviet
property agreement pertaining to Soviet bases was signed in 1948. Under its terms,
Budapest had agreed to lease to the Soviet troops all buildings they occupied at the end of
World War II but it retained ownership. In lieu of payments, the Soviets would renovate the
buildings. In 1956 the invading Soviet forces occupied more buildings and bases than in
1948; an agreement was made regarding their financ~al status in 1958. This agreement
invalidated the preceding documents. The ignorance of the high military leadership
concerning important aspects of the Soviet forces stationed in Hungary quickly became
apparent. . General (Ret.) Janos Sebok conceded that he and his former.colleagues in the
MOD had not known that Hungary served as a supply depot for Czechoslovakia and the
Ukraine. "We were also ·not clear," he said, "about how many Soviet soldiers were stationed
in our homeland. "112
In a short time the financial settlement of the Soviet troop pull-out became the niost
pugnaciously disputed issue between the two sides eliciting a great deal of previously
unimaginable ill-feeling, charges and counter-charges between the two sides. Budapest's
MOD, after researching the issue, had reached several troubling conclusions. It became
known, for instance, that in spite of the 194.8 agreement stating that Moscow was to bear all
costs for maintaining military bases and constructing new buildings, Hungary financed a
large share of these expenditures between 1949 and 1953. The Soviet side, however, only
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compensated Hungary for 10 percent of the costs. The Hungarian MOD's financial support
of the Soviet presence during this period was not regulated, and the Budapest chose not to
safeguard its own rights.
General Matvei Burlakov, Commander of the SGSF and the USSR' s representative in
charge of the withdrawals, estimated the value of the buildings the Sovfot troops erected in
Hungary at 10 billion forint ($ 135 million). 113 Moscow asked for compensation for their
investments in_and around the Hungarian bases: While the Hungarians did not directly refute
the Soviet figures, they wanted to consider several important qualifications. For instance;
Hungarian experts contended that many of the Soviet-built apartments conformed to Soviet
(having, for example, communal baths and kitchens) rather than Hungarian building
standards and thus were of little use to Hungary. Furthermore, the majority of not only the
apartment buildings but also the barracks were in such poor condition that they _were of
almost no value to their new owners. Ideally; the MOD would have liked these buildings to
be in the same condition ·as those maintained by the Hungarian forces.
As Soviet troops began to withdraw, many articles described the Soviet servicemen's
life in Hungary. Despite Burlakov's frequent references to the "friendship" existing between
Soviet soldiers and the Hungarian people, this relationship could perhaps·be best described as
calculating and self-seeking, with a heavy dose of Russophobia on the Hungarian side. 114
Soviet military leaders vigorously denied that Hungarians and Soviet soldiers conducted
"business deals, "115 although scores of newspaper and magazine articles contradicted their
disavowal. One such article graphically depicted the relationships between Hungarians anq
their Soviet "friends" in the village of Hajmasker, site of the first base vacated by the
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Soviets. 116 Village residents expressed not only their annoyance about the noise of the
Soviet military vehicles and the soldiers' occasional offenses but also mentioned the mutually
advantageous commercial relationship .that had existed between the village and the
/

troops. 117 Soviet soldiers sold everything from overalls and boots to gasoline and television
sets in exchange for Hungarian wine, brandy, soap, fruit and various food items, and of
course, cash.
The Soviets also sold machine guns and signal flares which they occasionally used to
threaten their Hungarian "friends" at a heavily frequented Veszprem county garbage
dump. 118 Many denounced Soviet soldiers for selling ammunition, weapons, and
explosives in the cities of Budapest, Gyor, Esztergom, and Szentendre. 119 Soviet
servicemen in Hungary lived in relatively primitive conditions. The food rations for ordinary
soldiers appear to have been very deficient. In an interview the former Commander of the
Soviet base in Budapest, Colonel (Ret.) Georgii Lakhno conceded that the cultural level of
Soviet officers "remains very low. "120 He acknowledged that disciplinary problems existed
within the Soviet units in Hungary. In fact, because of the widespread thievery and antisocial behavior, Soviet officers at some locations restricted their troops to base. Many
Soviet soldiers never had the opportunity to see "the world outside their barracks" during
their 2-year tour in Hungary.
Notwithstanding all of these problems, the with9rawal of the Soviet troops from
Hungary progressed on schedule. By the end of 1990 only 10-15 percent of the Soviet
troops remained in Hungary and the withdrawal was completed in June 1991. A number of
coi:itentious issues still need to be resolved, however. As long as full documentation of the

costs of the 45-year Soviet occupation remains unavailable, it is difficult to predict, through
the barrage of claims and counterclaims, which side will have to compensate the other. One
)

cannot help but feel that, in the end, the "zero payment" alt~rnative might be preferred, so
that no money will be involved. 121

C. Proliferation of Western Contacts
The HPA developed many important contacts with its Western counterparts during the
1980s. The successes of the Hungarian· military diplomacy were likely the result of a .wellplanned "Western policy program" starting in the mid-1980s and originated in the Foreign
Affairs Department of the MOD. In 1988-1990 these relations became more variegated and
substantial, signalling the Hungarian military's growing distance from its WTO partners.
In 1989 alone, Hungary received three NATO defense ministers and a number of toplevel military delegations. In May Dutch Minister of Defense Fritz Bolkenstein was the first
NATO defense minister to visit Hungary. 122 In August HPA Chief of Staff General Pacsek
paid visits to the U.S., the United Kingdom, Canada, and Switzerland. 123

He said that the

HPA wanted to improve relations not only with European members of NATO but also with
others "out of gunshot range." Pacsek announced plans for a two-year cooperation
agreement between the HPA and the Canadian Armed Forces which would allow regular toplevel meetings between Hungarian and Canadian military personnel. Budapest also hosted
British Defence Secretary Thomas King. Although King said that alliance structures had not
yet shown any "sign of genuine change," he stressed that confidence was increasing· and that
his visit had set an example, particularly in light of the Vienria CSCE talks. 124

The HPA also was represented at various international meetings, such as the
European Conference of Conscript Organizations held in Helsinki in August 1989. The
Hungarian and Soviet delegations were the first from the WTO to attend this annual
convention. 125 In December, Hungary and France submitted a joint "confidence-building
proposal" at the CSCE talks in Vienna. This was the first time that a NATO and a WTO
state jointly initiated a resolution. Moreover, a small Hungarian contingent (15 officers)
participated in the United Nations peace-keeping forces observing the cease-fire agreement
between Iraq and Iran. 126 In February 1990 the MOD and the Rand Corporation jointly
organized a conference at which top U.S. and Hungarian experts examined civil-military
relations in democratic political systems. 127
Hungary, together with Canada, also was instrumental in the org~ization of the
"Open Skies" conferences that attempted to revive President Eisenhower's proposal to
General Secretary Khrushchev at the 1955 Geneva summit meeting. The idea,
characteristically dismissed by the Soviet leader as "legalized espionage," was t6 allow
military airplanes to fly over each other's territory. Although agreements over technical
matters could not be achieved between the 23 participants at the April 1990 Budapest
meeting, the Hungarian and Canadian co-sponsors of the conference agreed that the longterm prospects of "Open Skies" were good. 128
In sum, since the mid-1980s the Hungarian military leadership has pursued an
ambitious foreign relations agenda oriented toward Western states. Like Hungary's foreign
policy toward the West, the country's military diplomacy, obviously supported by the
government and the (Communist) party leadership, was very fruitful. The successes
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achieved by Hungarian military diplomacy must, however, be put in their proper perspective.
The tangible results of the policy were some minor agreements holding the promise of
"regularized contacts'.' and the creation of a few (academic) exchange programs. These
accomplishments indicated a decade-long Hungarian commHment to disarmament and
demonstrated an attempt to ease the tension between the two alliances.

Concluding Thoughts

One could scarcely give a more succinct summary of the transformation of civilmilitary relations in Hungary than did Colonel Keleti, the capable spokesman of the MOD,
offering the following in an interview in late 1990: 129

The political systemic change has now been completed in the Hungarian armed
forces. One of the most important aspects of this is that the army is now a
body free of party struggles, characterized by the primacy of national interests
and the defense of national sovereignty, The Hungarian armed forces are
getting out of the Warsaw Pact, an alliance that worked against its members'
national interests. They are also realistically taking into account the events of
the past forty to fifty years, rehabili~ting (in some cases posthumously) the
officers removed in 1956, restoring national traditions and former unit n.ames
in the military, and strengthening their ties with social organizations and the
Churches. The armed forces are a part of Hungary's democratization process
and have become the army of the people and the nation.
It is important to note that in contrast with some other East European states, the
political transformation of Hungary was entirely peaceful and the military played no role in
it. One of the first acts of the new legislation was the passing of a ~onstitutional amendment
which clearly stated that the highest authority over the armed forces was the freely elected
President of the Republic. The military had become an institution subordinated to the
Constitution and elected state officials. As a result of the transformation of Jhe civil-military
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relations, the armed forces no longer had the o_pportunity to play any role in politics. The
political (i.e., Communist Party) structure in the armed forces was dismantled and military
personnel were prohibited from engaging in any manner of party politics within the barracks.
The military educational system was reformed to reflect the army's shifting loyalties, from
the Party and the Warsaw Pact to the nation-state and the Constitution. In short, the primary
consequence of the transformation of civil-military relations was the depoliticization of the
armed forces. At the same time, the external relations of the military had also changed to
mirror its regained independence from the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact.
Some of the most important by-products of Hungary's--and Eastern Europe's--political
transformation were the disclosures of wide-spread corruption and incompetence of the
country's leaders, an endemic facet of Communist systems everywhere. The shocking
excesses of the HPA leadership received a generous share of this attention. Few observers
remarked, however, that the top brass could not have succeeded without a system that
tolerated their activities. As the revelations filled the pages of the newly uncensored journals
J

and books, Hungarians were astonished not only by the details of the erstwhile HPA leaders'
posses·sions and persuasions but also where their stewardship had gotten the armed forces.
The confirmation that military policies were determined, first of all by the Kremlin
and secondly by the HSWP with only nominal •participation from the state should not have
come as a surprise. What did shock the people was the Party's and the military's
documented disregard of the legal system. Citizens learned that control over the armed
forces was not regulated by law, because such formalities were irrelevant and superfluous
niceties. After all, everyone knew who were in charge. It also was clearly revealed that the
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"alliance" that was supposed to defend Hungary from the imperialist West, .in essence robbed
Hungary of its defensive capabilities and rendered it impotent to fight any external enemy.
At the same time, the fact that one of the most important functions of their army was
protecting the rulers from the ruled was hardly sensational news to the popul~tion. 130
The leaders of the Hungarian Army are in an unenviable situation. First, in order to
attract the best and the brightest into the new officer. corps, they need to convince the
population, particularly the country's young men, that the new army is very different from
the thoroughly politicized HPA. This will not be easy for some time to come since the
middle and top ranks currently are dominated by officers with extensive ties to the
Communist regime. These people, however, cannot be easily replaced due to the fact that
despite their undesirable political connections to tlie past, their ·expertise is indispensable at
the present time. Second, Hungary does not have the resources to address the army's
financial problems. In the current socio-political and economic situation national defense
occupies a rather low position on the government's list of priorities. Third, partly as a
consequence of the preceding point and partly due to the country's former association with
the Warsaw Pact, Hungary is in an extremely vulnerable security situation as it would be
unable to defend itself from any one of its neighbors. It appears to be clear that without
Western help--whether in the form of giving Hungary surplus military equipment and/or
extending NATO's protective umbrella over the country--Budapest's security predica~ent
will not be overcome in the foreseeable future. The first signals of cooperation on military
issues between the Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland is indicative of the East Central
European states' capability of genuine collaboration in this area. Aside from enhancing their
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defensive capacities, such cooperation might also be looked upon very favorably by NATO's
leaders in Brussels.
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